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One of the most striking features of the postwar U.S. economy has
been the rapid decrease in the labor force participation of the elderly
at a time when the health of this group has been improving. In spite
of this, previous research, based on retrospective interviews with the
retired population, usually concludes that poor health accornts for the
overwhelming majority of retirements.
The current results suggest that nothing could be further from the
truth. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we follow
a cohort of white married males through their sixties to estimate a
model of retirement behavior. Using several definitions of retirement
suggesced in the literature, the results suggest that the two key policy
parameters of the social security system —theincome guarantee and the
implicit tax on earnings —exertan enormous influence on retirement
decisions. For example, our results suggest that a decrease in the
implicit tax rate on earnings from one—half to one—third would reduce
the annual probability of retirement by almost sixty percent!
Applying the coefficient estimates to time series data on the labor
force participation of the elderly implies that the social security sys-
tem has been the major factor in the explosion in earlier retirement.SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT DECISIONS*
by
Michael J. Boskin**
The rapid growth of the social security system in recent
years has been one of the most important developments in the United
States' economy: social security benefits and taxes are each the
second largest——and fastest growing——item on their respective
side of the federal government budget and will soon exceed
$100 billion. For a large fraction of all U.S. families, social
security taxes exceed their income taxes and expected social
security benefits are the major item in their retirement portfolio.
The system has become so large that even modest changes in benefits
or their method of finance may have important impacts on the entire
economy. While the social security system is widely heralded by
politicians and the public as a vital element of our income security
system, it recently has come under increased criticism from econo-
mists. For example, Pechman, Aaron and Taussig [19] and Brittain
[3 ]objectto payroll tax finance as inequitable; Buchanan [4
and Campbell [5 ]wouldlike to see the transfer, or anti—poverty,
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goal of the system separated from the income replacement, or annuity,
goal; and Feldstein [7]estimatesa huge substitution of expected
social security benefits for private savings, which in turn leads
him to question whether the system should be financed on apay—as—
you—go basis [9].
Theprimary objective of social security is to replace
income during retirement (or disability); in so doing, social
security benefits supplement——and potentially substitute for——prior
savings (including private pensions, equity in a home, savings
accounts, stocks and bonds, etc.), intrafamily transfers of income
and, perhaps most importantly, continued earnings. The purpose of
the present paper is to focus on the potential inducement to retire
earlier in the presence of social security than in its absence, and
the corresponding substitution of social security benefits for
potential earnings. Toward this end, section 1 reviews some previous
attempts to study retirement behavior. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical model which explains the ways in which the current
social security system affects labor supply and retirement decisions.
Section 3 details the data used in the analysis. Section 4 reports
the empirical results——primarily probability of retirement equa-
tions which relate retirement decisions to parameters of the social
security system and other financial and demographic variables.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the implications
of the results for social security policy, as well as some sugges-
tions for future research.
.3
1. A Cursory Review of the Literature on Retirement
Social security guarantees elderly retired persons a certain
income based upon their previous covered earnings and taxes some of
these benefits back if earnings exceed a modest amount. Hence,
both the income and wage effects of the system operate to reduce
labor supply. Since some workers achieve a preferred consumption
bundle by working enough so that they receive no benefits (i.e. they
elect not to be covered currently by the system), others would
retire independently of their social security benefits, and the sizes
of the income——or benefit guarantee——and wage——or earnings test——
effects are unknown, the overall effect of social security on
retirement is primarily an empirical question.
Previous research on retirement decisions may be divided
into three types corresponding to the type of data used: retro-
spective studies of retired workers, prospective studies of workers
approaching retirement age, and studies of the labor force par-
ticipation rate of the elderly.
In an early and frequently cited study, Steiner and Dorfman
[20] report the results of a special 1952 Follow—Up Survey of the
Aged to the Current Population Survey. In particular, all men not
in the labor force were asked why they stopped working. They
conclude that "...only a small proportion of the older population
had been driven out of the labor force by retirement systems.ttl
1Steiner and Dorfman [20], p. 49.4
Thus, the overwhelming majority retired "voluntarily"; further,
"... in79 per cent of all voluntary retirements poor health was
the major reason for retirement,"1 While it is undoubtedly correct
that some people retire because of poor health, accepting the con-
clusion that most do so from retrospective surveys of retired workers
is hazardous: poor health is certainly the most socially acceptable
reason for retirement and, on average, the health of those inter-
viewed had probably deteriorated since retirement. Yet retrospective
studies invariably conclude that poor health is the primary reason
for retirement.
For example, Wentworth [23] summarizes a series of Social
Security Administration surveys of the aged in the years 1941—1963
by noting that "..approximately88 percent of the beneficiaries
queried in the 1941—51 surveys and 74 percent of those in the 1963
survey had their jobs terminated by their employer or were forced
to quit because of ill health."2 Thus, the conclusion usually
reached in these studies is that social security benefits cushion
income declines beyond the control of the individual worker and
that relatively few workers are induced to retire to receive benefits.
On the other hand, the 1963 Social Security Survey of the Aged [22] also
found that a substantial fraction of those nonbeneficiaries report-
ing an inclination to retire soon intended to do so to obtain
retirement (public and/or private) benefits. Further, a considerable
'Steiner and Dorfman,op. cit., p. 49.
2Wentworth [23],p. 5.5
I shiftinto partial retirement——reduced hours of work and changes
in occupation——was noted. Finally, Epstein and Murray [6] note
an increase in the number of aged men "... whomight get some
kind of job if they were interested, but prefer the leisure of
retirement."1
Barfield and Morgan [1 ]conductedan interesting study of
prospective retirement plans; in particular, they focused onthe
decision to retire before age 65. Analyzing data from a national
sample collected in 1966, they report ordinary least squares regres-
sions of whether or not early retirement was planned on a variety
of variables. The most important result was that planned early
retirement was strongly and positively related to expected pension
income (government and private) and negatively associated with a
subjective evaluation of health. While these results are both
intriguing and suggestive, relying on reported plans for retirement
——in an uncertain world where expectations may not be realized——is
hazardous at best. A preferable alternative is to analyze actual
retirement decisions.
In his classic study, Long [151 notes the decline in the
labor force participation rate of older workers in the U.S. and
elsewhere since 1890. He examines a variety of types of data, and
concludes that neither the growth of pension programs——public and
private——nor the general increase in personal disposableincome
accounts for the sharp decline. Indeed, Long's major conclusion
1Epstein and Murray [6 ],p.105.6
. isthat jobs have been competed away from older workers by younger
women.
Pechman, Aaron and Taussig [.19] were the first to present evi-
dence that social security accelerates retirement; they report the
results of an international cross—sectional regression on aggregate
data for 1960 from 19 countries of the labor force participation rate
of the population over age 65 on the ratio of per capita benefits to
the average wage in manufacturing and other variables. Their results
suggest that the higher this replacement ratio, the lower the labor
force participation rate of the elderly, i.e., the more generous
the social security system, the lower the labor supply of the
elderly. Whether this is caused by the income effect of high bene-
fit guarantees, the wage effect of rigid earnings tests in countries
with generous benefits or even the wage effect of higher social
insurance taxes to finance the higher benefits is impossible to
tell from their results. Feldstein [8] reports a similar result,
also based on an international cross section, on his way to esti-
mating private savings functions. He also notes a negative effect
on labor force participation of men over 65 of retirement tests.
While these studies are open to the usual criticisms of international
cross sections, the results do suggest that higher social security
benefits do induce a withdrawal from the labor force.
Thus, there are two competing conjectures concerning the
effects of social security on retirement. On the one hand, a group
of studies suggest that the social security system plays a relative-
ly passive and minor role, the major reason for retirement being7
poor health. On the other, evidence from international cross—sections
—albeithardly the type of data upon which one would like to place
exclusive reliance —suggeststhat social security induces —orenables
—elderlymen to withdraw from the labor force.
Aggregate time series data for the United States reveal that the
labor force participation rates of elderly males have fallen dramatically
in the postwar period. These data are presented in Table 1.1. The rate
for both whites and nonwhites is currently less than half of the rate
in the late nineteen forties. In the 55—64 age bracket, the rates have
fallen thirteen and twenty—one percent for whites and nonwhites, respec-
tively. The decline in this age group, of course, is heavily concentrat-
ed in the rates for men in their early sixties; more men now claim ini-
tial social security benefits age age sixty—two than at age sixty—five.
This sharp secular decline in the labor force participation caine
during a period when the economy was relatively healthy and the health
of the elderly on average improved; it also came during a period of
broad extention of social security :overage and sharp increases in bene-
fits. While these correlations may be merely a coincidence, they should
make us skeptical of the survey data alleging social security had no effect
and poor health was the prime mover in retirement decisions.
We shall present and analyze below evidence from an entirely
different——and in many ways superior——type of data: a panel study
of a cohort of elderly men. Before doing so, it is worthwhile to
examine in somewhat more detail the ways in which social security
affects labor supply.Table 1.1
Labor Force Participation Rates for
Elderly Males, 1948-74
White Nonwhite
55-64 yrs. 65 and over 55-64 yrs. 65 and over
1948 89.6 46.5 88.6 50.3
1949 87.6 46.6 86,0 51.4
1950 87.3 45.8 81.9 45.5
1951 87.4 44.5 84.6 49.5
1952 87.7 42.5 85.7 43.3
1953 87.7 41.3 86.7 41.1
1954 89.2 40.4 83.0 41.2
1955 88.4 39.5 83.1 40.0
1956 88.9 40.0 83.9 39.8
1957 88.0 37.7 82.4 35.9
1958 88.2 35.7 83.3 34.5
1959 87.9 34.3 82.5 33.5
1960 87.2 33.3 82.5 31.2
1961 87.8 31.9 81.6 29.4
1962 86.7 30.6 81.5 27.2
1963 86.6 28.4 82.5 27.6
1964 86.1 27.9 80.6 29.6
1965 85.2 27.9 78.8 27.9
1966 84.9 27.2 81.1 25.6
1967 84.9 27.1 79.3 27.2
1968 84.7 27.3 79.6 26.6
1969 83.9 27.3 77.9 26.1
1970 83.3 26.7 79.2 27.4
1971 82.6 25.6 77.8 24.5
1972 81.2 24.4 73.6 23.6
1973 79.0 22.8 70.7 22.6
1974 78.1 22.5 70.2 21.7
Source: Manpower Report of the President, 1975.
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2.Social Security and Labor Supply
The social security system has three basic features which
affect life—cycle labor supply and saving decisions: the benefits,
the social insurance contributions, and the earnings test. The
social security system imposes a tax for old age (and disability)
insurance of approximately 6 percent each on employees and employers1
on the first $14,100 of earnings; it provides benefits during
retirement based in part on previous taxes; and potential benefits
are reduced if earnings exceed a certain modest amount. Thus,
throughout one's working life the social security tax reduces the
after—tax wage rate. Once one retires, the system provides an
income flow, but imposes an implicit tax on earnings beyond a certain
amount.
Focusing on a year during which a worker eligible for social
security benefits is contemplating retirement, and ignoring life cycle
phenomena we may characterize the effect of the system on labor supply
and retirement decisions in the usual way. Before accounting for the
social security system, the budget constraint of the individual is
(l+r)K + W(T-L) =PX+ K. (2.1)
'It is usually argued that employees bear both parts of the
tax (see Brittain [21); however, Feldstein [101 has called this
assertion into question, when the system affects saving. If we
argue that the benefits would be financed by some other tax (which
may itself affect saving and/or labor supply), the employeeburden
argument is probably a good approximation.
simple discussion of life—cycle effects is presented in
Appendix B.9
Assets plus earnings equals consumption of goods plus saving
With a tax rate of t, benefits of B when no earnings are made,
and an implicit tax under the earnings test of ,thebudget constraint
becomes
B + K(l+r) + W(l-t—c*)(T—L) =PX+ LK. (2.2)
Graphically (ignoring saving ),thebudget constraint changes as in
Figure 1, where we see that the worker, in attempting to maximize
utility, must choose which arm of the budget constraint he wishes to
be on. Since for the period we will be studying, the earnings test
had two components (a 50 cent reduction per dollar of earnings over
a certain range, then increasing to a dollar), the effective budget
constraint has three arms: the parts AB, BC and CD. Hence social
security creates a situation where workers face a kinky budget
constraint. In some cases social security will not affect labor
supply during part of old age. In Figure la, the worker works full
time regardless of the social security system; in Figure lb, the
worker retires completely regardless of the social security system.
However, many workers may be in the situation depicted in Figures lc
and id: in the former, the worker works a substantial amount of
time in the absence of the social security system, but retires






Figure 1. Social Security and Labor Supply
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partial retirement.'
These effects——providing an income support and taxing earnings
with the earnings test——both operate to reduce the labor supply of
some elderly workers. Before turning to an attempt to estimate them,
we remind the reader of two points made above: asset holdings are
endogenous and determined simultaneously with life—cycle labor supply
decisions; social security benefits may drive down income from assets2
and the one—period analysis is then conditional upon the value of
assets held; and the system may well affect labor supply prior to
old age through the taxes and through the effects of benefits on the
shadow price of saving.
Since we do not have data following individuals over their
entire lifetime——or even a substantial fraction thereof——we can say
very little about the life—cycle phenomena described above. Hence,
we turn to a discussion focusing on one important part of of the hf e—
cycle——old age——and the retirement decision.
1This multi—armed budget constraint produces certain econo-
metric problems in estimating labor supply functions. The density
of labor supply piles up at several discrete values; hence we must
estimate the probability the worker will choose to be on one of the
three arms of the budget constraint simultaneously with hours worked
conditional upon being on a particular arm. I am currently working
on a generalization of Tobit analysis to deal with this problem.
The estimates presented below, in part, skirt this issue. See Hall
[111 for a discussion of this problem in the two—armed case.
2See Feldstein [71forevidence this indeed occurs.12
3. The Data
The data for this study are taken from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, a national sample of five thousand households.1
The important feature of these data from our viewpoint is that the
households were reinterviewed annually for the five years 1968
through 1972.2 Hence, for each year of the survey period, a substan-
tial amount of information is available on each household. Especially
relevant are the data pertaining to earnings, assets, age, occupation,
hours of work, length of time on the current job, etc.
From this body of data, I have extracted information on 131
households which were headed by the same white married male, aged
61 through 65, for the five years of the survey. Hence, by the end
of the five years, these heads of households are aged 66 through 70.
We follow the labor market status of these heads of households
through the crucial years of retirement decisions. The variables
used in the analysis are described below.
Retirement. A study by the Social Security Administration
[211 notes no less than six definitions of retirement in common use.
Among these are zero hours of work per year, less than 35 hours per
week of work, saying that one is retiree, etc. The common perception
of retirement is a stepping—down from normal career patterns——leaving
the main job or occupation, working less and earning less. A
1These data are described in detail in Survey Research
Center [21].
2
The annual reinterviewing is still in progress.13
substantial number of people say they are retired while working
several hundred hours per year for several years. Several defini-
tions of retirement were tried in the estimation of the probability
of retirement equations: less than quarter—time work, less than
half—time work, less than one—tenth time work, and the individual
worker's statement that he was retired. The result using all four
definitions are similar, and only those for quarter—time work
are presented below.1 This definition corresponds roughly to
the point where most of the sample becomes subject to the earnings
test. A state of quasi—retirement was also defined for use in
following a pattern of gradual stepping—down from full—time work.
Again, similar results were obtained for several definitions map-
ping hours of work, wages, and occupation into quasi—retirement.
The definition used in the results presented below was less than
half—time work (or earnings less than half of full—time earnings
on the job previously held).
The distribution of actual hours and earnings——as we would
suspect from the discussion above——tends to pile up in certain ranges,
roughly corresponding to full—time work, work not subject to the
earnings test, etc. Further, about 40 percent of the sample retired
before age 65, while slightly under 40 percent were still working
at age 66 and beyond. Of the latter, two—fifths were working very
few hours.
1The other results are availableupon equest.
.14
Social security benefits. The maximum social security
benefits obtainable for the couple are based on the primary insur-
ance amount from estimated average monthly earnings. Average
monthly earnings are estimated as the social security maximum for
those earning the maximum or receiving the maximum benefit during
the survey period and imputed either from a regression of earnings
on education, occupation, and other personal characteristics or from
actual benefits received and information on age, earnings, etc. The
benefits formula for each year is used and benefits are adjusted
downward for each year from age 62 to 64, and, of course, are zero
for age 61. It is worth pointing out that the group under study
receives social security benefits which are a large multiple of
their taxes paid in plus interest. This occurs both because of the
blanketing in of all existing workers each time benefits are increased
and the large increase in legislated benefits, which bear little relation
to taxes paid in plus interest (see Campbell [5] and Brittain [3]).
Income from assets. Income from assets include the usual
rents, pensions, dividends, interest and asset part of business income.
Also included are the imputed income to home ownership (at 6 percent of
equity) and to automobiles (at 12 percent of value). Experiments with
a two—year average yielded results virtually identical to use of current
income from assets.
Net earninzs. Net earnings refers to earnings net of earnings—
tested decreases in social security benefits. They are calculated in
two ways——using actual earnings and using expected earnings at full—time
or part—time work, i.e. for different measures of a standardized number15
of hours.' While the former is potentially endogenous, it reflects the
actual point chosen on a particular arm of the budget constraint. In
any event, the results are quite similar regardless of the definition
used. We standardize at 1750 hours for those not working in defining
potential net e rnings for full—time work, and at 875 hours for quasi—
retirement. Changing these indexes of a standard number of hours by
2 modest amounts does not affect the results.
Age dummies. A variable taking the value one when the worker
is 65, zero otherwise; and likewise when the worker is 62.
Education. Years of schooling.
Spouse's earnings. Only infrequently does the spouse's earn-
ings amount to a substantial share of total earnings. The actual fig-
ures are used. Were our data set much larger, we would have attempted
to build a simultaneous husband—wife retirement model. Since only a
small fraction of these wives worked any appreciable amount, we eschew
any such attempt here.
Hours ill. Total hours of illness estimated for the year. In
light of the conjecture reported above that poor health is the primary
cause of retirement, it is interesting to note that for those people
in the sample who retired, the average hours of illness the year prior
to retirement was 59.2; for the entire sample of work years, the average
was 84.5!
All dollar values are adjusted for inflation by deflating by the
consumer price index.
1Potential full—time earnings are imputed on the basis of a
regression of earnings on education, occupation, location, union mem-
bership, health, etc.
2Again, results are available upon request. Variables referringI
to the specific year were also included (year dummies, unemployment rate,
etc.), but their coefficients were small and not statistically different
from zero.16
4. Empirical Results
As mentioned above, there are many different definitions of
retirement which have been used by various researchers. Generally,
retirement entails a stepping down from a normal career and employment
pattern. The stepping down may entail an abrupt reduction of hours of
work to zero, a change of job or occupation, a gradual reduction of
hours of work, etc. We may conceive of the worker as being in one of
N labor market states (e.g., state 1 may be full—time work on the career
job, state 2 part—time work on the same job, state 3 full—time work on
a different job,. ..,state N zero hours of market work, etc.). Observing
individual workers for a sequence of years, we may characterize this
stepping down process by a matrix of transition probabilities:
ll ••lN
..:
whereP1 is the probability that the worker moves from state i (e.g.,
full—time work) to state j (e.g., part—time). These probabilities, in
turn, depend on a vector of variables such as earnings, social security
benefits, age, health and education, some of which depend upon which
state the worker chooses to occupy.
As a simple example, consider a two—way partition of labor mar-
ket states into working and retired. Then P12 is the probability a17
.
workerretires in a given period. P12 may depend upon social security
benefits and earnings, which differ dramatically if he works or retires.
Of course, once we know P12, we also know P11, the probability the worker
keeps working. Finally, there is a duality between the transitions among
states1and the distribution of the elderly population among the various
labor market states.
A full derivation of this model as the multinomial logistic para—
meterization of a multi—state Markov chain is presented in Appendix A.
As mentioned above, we have experimented with different numbers
of states defining employment status as well as different definitions of
the states. The results are rather robust against modest changesin the
definition of the states. Our data limit us to a two—state (working/re-
tired) and a three—state (close to full—time work, quasi—retirement, re-
tirement) parameterization. We examine the effect on the probability of
retirement of several types of variables: health (hours ill), wage effects
(net earnings), income effects (social security benefits and income from
assets), cross—wage effects (spouse's earnings), and institutional retire-
ment tests (represented by a dummy variable for age 65). Conjectures on
the signs and magnitudes of these effects were discussed above in the
review of the literature. Briefly, one school of thought would expect
the effects of the age dummy and hours ill to be large and positive, and
most other effects to be small. As we shall see, nothing could be further
from the truth.
'Note that some transitions may have probabilities of zero or
close to zero, i.e., it may be rare to observe certain transitions.18
Table 4.1 presents our basic probability of retirement
equation. We note first that the sign of the health effect is
opposite to that conjectured in numerous previous studies. This
effect, however, is not estimated very precisely. While some workers
undoubtedly do retire for reasons of poor health and the measure of
health is open to question, these data provide no support for the
conjecture that poor health is the prime mover in retirement decisions.
The effects of all of the other variables are measured quite
precisely, and operate in the expected direction. The probability
of retirement in a given year at mean values of the right hand
variables is about eight percent.
There is clearly a large increase in the probability of
retirement at age 65. Whether this is due to social custom or
institutionalized retirement rules within firms is difficult to
judge. It is not uncommon for workers to change occupations in
their sixties——stepping down from their normal career to a lower
wage part—time job.
There is a small negative effect of the spouse's earnings
on the probability ofretirement.1 Thus, leisure of husbands and
wives appear to be complements in old age.
Turning attention to income from assets, we note thatthe
effect of an increase in asset income is a modest increase in the
probability of retirement. At mean values of the othirvariables,
'Were our data set larger,we would have attempted to
examine the retirement decisions of husbands and wives simultaneously.19
Table 4.1
Probability of Retirement Equation
S
Variable Coefficient (x
Social security benefits 0.917
(0.288)












Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
.
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a $1,000 annual increase in income from assets increases the proba-
bility of retirement by 15 percent.
The effect of the income guarantee in social security on
the probability of retirement is large and, as expected, positive.
Indeed, it is seven times as large as the effect of income from
assets. An increase in social security benefits from $3,000 to
$4,000 per year per couple raises the probability of retirement
from 7.5 percent to 16 percent. Why is the effect of social security
benefits so much more important than the effect of income from
assets? Social security benefits are guaranteed for the remainder
of one's life and are indexed against inflation) Further, to the
extent bequests are planned, personal wealth may be transferred to
one's heirs, whereas social security benefits cannot. Also, income
from assets includes the imputed income to owner—occupied housing;
the elderly may be reluctant to borrow against their equity for fear
of living so long as to have to vacate the house and pay capital
gains taxes.
Finally, net (after tax and earnings test) earnings has the
predicted negative effect; indeed, it is large and measured quite
precisely. The negative effect of net earnings Is roughly half again
as large as the positive effect of the income guarantee. A $1,000
Increase in net earnings reduces the probability of retirement by
about 60 percent. Since the earnings test reduces net earnings
substantially for some fraction of elderly workers, it clearly
1Benefits are now indexed directly; previously, they were
implicitly indexed——with a lag——by periodic Congressional review.21
.
dramaticallyincreases the probability ofretirement.1 A reduction
of the implicit tax on earnings from one—half to one—third cuts the
annual probability of retirement in half for typical workers. The
relationship between benefits and the earnings test is also important.
In the example given above, a $1,000 increase in social security bene-
fits which exposed more earnings to the earnings test would have only
about one—fourth the impact on retirement as a pure increase in bene-
fits (i.e., a $1,000 increase combined with a $1,000 increase in earn-
ings exempted from the earnings test).
Thus, the overall impact of the social security system,
through the income guarantee and the earnings test, is clearly to
induce retirement.
We noted above that the coefficient for social security
benefits was much larger than the coefficient for income from assets.
We may make a formal test of the equality of these two coefficients
by the likelihood ratio method. Table 4.2 reports the results of
a regression in which the coefficients of social security benefits
and income from assets are constrained to be equal. The quantity
—2 ln A, where A is the ratio of the constrained to the unconstrained
maximum of the likelihood function is a variable. In this case,
our statistic of 7.23 exceeds the critical value at conventional
levels and we reject the hypothesis that the effects of social
security benefits and income from assets are equal. This conclusion
has a startling implication if Feldstein's II 7 1 result is correct
that private savings substitute virtually dollar for dollar with
1See the discussion in section 5 below.22
Table 4.2
Probability of Retirement Equation
Variable 3a
Coefficient (x 10 )














aAsptotic standard errors in parentheses.23
S
social security savings. Even in an actuarily sound program, the net
impact of this substitution is an inducement toretire!'
'Even once account is taken of the using up of social
security capital.24
In Table 4.3, we present results from a logistic regression
expanded to include education and age sixty—two, and year dummies.
Mincer [17] notes the positive correlation between education and retire-
ment age. This simple correlation may disguise the influences of other
variables associated with increases in education (such as higher earn-
ings). The estimated coefficient has the expected negative sign, but
is quite small and not measured very precisely.
Since the worker may retire and commence receiving social
security benefits at age sixty—two, we include a dummy variable for
age equals sixty—two. The estimated coefficient is negative, and not
measured at all precisely.
To see if there is a general age effect on retirement (in addi-
tion to the age equals sixty—five effect) over this age range, dummy
variables for each year were included. If there is a general age
effect, the coefficients should increase year by year. In fact, this
is not the case) Hence, in this age range, age does not appear to
affect retirement probabilities except indirectly through its effect
on the other variables. At later ages there well may be a pure age
effect.
The coefficients of the original variables change only slightly
with the introduction of these additional variables. The most notable
change is the slight increase in the absolute value of the coefficient
on net earnings. These results suggest that our results are not at all
due to a spurious correlation through time among age, retirement and
social security benefits.
formal likelihood ratio test of the equality of these coef-
ficients passes easily at conventional levels.25
.
Table4.3
Probability of Retirement Equation
Variable Coefficient (x
Social security benefits 0.893
(0.353)





















aA5PO1C standard errors in parentheses.26
Finally, we present in Table 4.4 the results of a slightly
more general model——one with three labor market states:regular
work, quasi—retirement, and retirement, as defined abovein section 3?
The estimated coefficients are quite similar to those inTable 4.1,
all coefficients having the same sign as in the simpler model,and
most are measured relatively precisely.
Again, we note the positive inducement to retire at age65
and the negative effect of spouse's earnings.
The effect of income from assets on the probability of
either retiring or quasi—retiring is positive, but modest.
The effect of social security benefits on the probability
of either retiring or quasi—retiring is positive and much larger
than that of income from assets. At mean values of the independent
variables, a $1,000 increase in social security benefitsis associ-
ated with an increase of 40 percent in the probabilityof quasi—
retirement and of 60 percent in the probability of retirement.
Again, the negative effect of net earnings——modestin the
case of quasi—retirement and large in the caseof retirement——is
measured quite precisely. The earnings test induces both quasi—
retirement and complete retirement.
Of course, there are also movements out of quasi—retire-
ment (part—time work), usually into complete retirement. We present
in Table 4.5 estimates of the probability of suchmovements.2
1We noted a small amount of "unretirement" in the date and
tried to estimate probability of unretirement (P21) equations.The
small sample size prevented us from noting any general tendencies.
2lnfrequent movements from quasi—retirement back to full—
time work also occur; our estimates for this movement were very
imprecise and are not reported here.27
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Combined with the results from Table 4.4 they reveal a picture of
gradual (perhaps stepwise is more accurate) retirement; movements
from full—time to part—time work (perhaps in a different occupation)
to complete retirement over a number of years are not uncommon.
Again, the effects are those we have come to expect——strong
negative net earnings effects, strong positive social security
income and age equal to 65 effects) and modest income from asset
effects. Because of the smaller number of potential observations,
the individual coefficients are not measured as precisely as those
reported above. Hence, we have somewhat more confidence in the
empirical results reported above. It is worth noting that for many
elderly persons working part—time, social security benefit increases
may not be earnings tested over a modest range.
Thus, the results reported above describe a complete sto-
chastic structure of retirement decisions——including the stepping—
down gradually phenomenon described above. The estimates may be
used to estimate the effects of alternative policies on retirement
decisions and their time path.
What do these results imply for the time series decline in
the labor force participation rates of elderly males? Of the var-
iables affecting retirement, the effect of the growth in spouse's
earnings would be to reduce the probability of retirement; so, perhaps,
would the improved health of the elderly (despite our unreliable
negative coefficient!). Certainly the growth of after—tax real earn-
ings would do so. Of these three effects, the effect of net earnings30
is the only one which would be very important given our coefficients.
Hence, we must seek an explanation for the decline in the labor force
participation in the tremendous increase in social security benefits'
and the negating of part of the effect of net earnings increases by
the earnings test and expansion of social security coverage. Indeed,
assuming on average that one—half of the real increase in earnings
has been offset by reduced social security benefits and allowing for
the growth in real "full" social security benefits, using the coef-
ficients in Table 4.1 suggests that the social security system has
increased the annual probability of retirement by some forty percent!
Since the actual reduction in labor force participation (refer back
to Table 1.1) appears to be about fifty percent for the over sixty—
five group and perhaps half of that for the 61—65 age cohort, we see
that social security has been the prime mover in the acceleration of
retirement !2
We turn next to a discussion of some overall implications of
these results and some suggestions for future research.
1The modest growth in income fromassets combined with the small
coefficient account for only a very small Increase in the annual prob-
ability of retirement.
20fcourse, with much more data we could try to track retire-
ment by age, marital status, occupation, etc. The aggregate figures
maycoverup important differences among different groups!31
.
5.Conclusion
If the results reported above are at all accurate, they
suggest that recent increases in social security benefits and cov-
erage, combined with the earnings test are a significant contributor
to the rapid decline of the labor force participation of the elderly
in the United States. The social security system Is inducing (or
enabling) a substantial fraction of the elderly population to retire
earlier than they would have in the absence of the system. While a
general analysis of the welfare economics of such movements is beyond
the scope of this paper, a few comments are worth making.
First, the earnings test creates a huge distortion in the
labor supply decisions of a large number of elderly workers. The
distortion of this work—leisure choice produces the usual dead—weight
loss of the analysis of the effects of taxes on labor supply (see
Harberger [12]). Liberalization of the earnings test would dramatically
reduce the probability of retirement and improve the allocation of re-
sources.1 However, the flow of funds through the social security sys-
tem probably would have to be increased. This has led many researchers
(e.g., Pechman, et. al. [19]) to argue that reduction of the implicit
tax in the earnings test is too costly. Two provisos need to be added
to this allegation.
1One can also imagine a wide variety of external economies
and diseconomies associated with driving the elderly out of the labor
force.
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First, the only real resource cost would be any additional
distortions resulting from increased taxes to finance the change in
the earnings test (and these are likely to fall well short of the
marginal gain in welfare of reducing the earnings test tax both because
the labor supply of the elderly is much more elastic than that of the
general population and because the marginal welfare cost is a function
of the marginal tax rate on earnings, which for many elderly persons
substantially exceeds the rate for the non—elderly).
Second, the large labor supply elasticity itself would sub-
stantially reduce the net Impact on the flow of funds required to
finance the additional benefits for two reasons: the increased labor
supply of the elderly would increase the direct social security taxes
paid by the elderly and the decreased earnings tested rate would apply
to a larger earnings base.
Second, while we have produced no direct evidence relating to
the effects of social security on saving or labor supply prior to old
age, our results are certainly consistent with the induced retirement
effect discussed by Feldstein [71 in his analysis of social security
and saving. Thus, any substitution of social security for private
saving is in spite of induced retirement working to increasesaving.1
Finally, let me conclude by noting that the conclusions above
are based on a single source of data and a modest sample size. Further
'Indeed, the results of Munnell [18] suggest that the induced
retirement effect thus far has offset the asset substitution effect.
She suggests the net effect eventually will be a decrease in saving.33
S
analysis of panel studies is certainly in order to help confirm or
reject these conclusions; indeed, I hope that the entire subject of
social insurance will begin to receive the attention it deserves.
.
1Oncethe mature males sampie of the Parnes data reaches retire-
ment age and once the Retirement History Survey records several more
years of information, we will have two large samples with which to ad—
dress the questions raised in the current paper.34
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Appendix A: The Statistical Model
We observe an individual's labor market behavior for five
consecutive years. Let the individual be in one of N states (e.g.
full—time work, quasi—retirement, retirement), choose the condi-
tional logit parametrization of the probabilities of movements among
states,1 and focus for the moment on transitions out of a single
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where is the probability individual s will move from state 1
(e.g. full—time work) to state 9. (e.g. retirement) in period t,
X is a vector of variables for individual s in time tinstaten,
nst
and the 's are unknown parameters to be estimated. The 's may
be interpreted as relative shadow weights or prices attached to the
variables in choosing which state to move to each period. We choose
1Conditional logit estimation is developed in McFadden [16].37
the maximum likelihood method of estimating The part of the
likelihood function referring to a single state i may be written as:
S
Ti TI p. v [l,N] (A.2)
s=i tT. iv,st
is
where T. is the set of times individual s is in state i. The is
entire likelihood function, of course, is ii%. To maximize the
likelihood of observing our sample in the sequence of states they
occupy, given their right—hand variables in each state in each
period, we take logarithms
in =
tT. in (A.3) •
anddifferentiate with respect to the unknown ,
BlnoC. inP. 1= iv,st
(A.4) L L
steT.is
wheredenotes possible states and q indexes right hand variables.
Hence, we have as many first—order derivatives as the product of
the number of right hand variables and one less than the number of
states. Now
TiSee Kendall and Stuart [14] fora discussion of the
properties of maximum likelihood estimators and Kemeny and Snell
[13] for an introduction to Markov chains.
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(1 — ifv =
Equations(4.5) may be substituted into (4.4). To maximize the
likelihood function, these first derivatives must be set equal to
zero and the resulting system of equations solved. We use Newton's
method, which requires information on the second partial derivatives
of the likelihood function. The iterative procedure is defined by
t+i =— [B}A
(A.6)
where T refers to iteration number, B is the matrix of second partial
derivatives, and A is the vector of first partial derivatives,
each evaluated at thevector obtained in iteration r. Typical
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. Theiterative process is said to converge when successive itera-
tions yield sufficiently similar estimates of .Further,the
square roots of the negative of the diagonal elements of B may be
used as estimated standard errors of the estimated coefficient
vector .
Theimportant thing to note about the model is that it
enables us to capture the stochastic structure of retirement deci-
sions——retirement may take place gradually as potential retirees
pass through a series of labor market states (full—time work,
part—time work, complete retirement, etc.), perhaps even moving
back and forth among several. Our model potentially enables us to
capture such movements through their dependence on a series of
variables which may in turn depend upon time. Thus, if accurate
estimates of the coefficients are found, the effects of alterna-
tive policies, such as the provision of social security benefits and
the earnings test under social security, which affect the variables
influencing retirement decisions, on the time structure and extent
of retirement may be estimated.
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I AppendixB: A Life Cycle Labor Supply Model
Consider an individual planning his lifetime consumption of
goods, X, and leisure, L. We assume the individual acts to maximize
discounted lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint, i.e. he
T
maximizes ert U(X, L)dt (B.l)
t=0
subject to
K =rK+ W(t)(T —L(t))—P(t)X(t), (B.2)
where T is time available, K is assets, K saving, and W(t) and
P(t) are the wage rate (after—tax) and price of consumption goods.
Form the Hamiltonian
=eU(X,L) + PK(t)[rK + W(t)(T—L(t)) —P(t)X(t)I(B.3)
where PK(t) is the shadow price of saving. Necessary conditions for
an optimum are then












i.e. the consumer workers equate the instantaneous marginal rate of









the shadow price of saving is equal to each of the time discounted
marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, divided by their
respective prices. From this set of optimum conditions, we may derive
the consumer—worker's optimal lifetime pattern of consumption of S
leisure and goods, as well as the comparative dynamic effects on the
consumption of goods and leisure of changes in wages, prices and
assets. Since explicit solutions require specific functional forms
for utility functions, we present here only a heuristic discussion
of these effects. The general labor supply function may be written as
LS =f(P,W, K0) (B.7)
where the coefficients on the price, wages and assets depend upon age,
the interest rate and the initial shadow price of saving as well as
upon parameters of the utility function.
Fist, compared to the usual comparative static result that
labor supply may be an increasing or decreasing function of wage rates,
depending upon whether the income or substitution effect dominates,
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the wage elasticity of labor supply now also depends upon the sensi-
tivity of the shadow price of saving to wage changes. A permanent
increase in wage rates makestheindividual wealthier and is most
likely to decrease the shadow price of saving.
Second, the time pattern of labor supply also depends upon
the shadow price of saving. An increase in this initial shadow price
will accelerate the time rate of change of leisure consumption.
Thus, any program which alters the wage rates or assets of
individuals potentially affects labor supply and saving over the en-
tire life cycle.